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THE "GREY AREAS" AND "YELLOW ZONES" OF SPLIT
SOVEREIGNTY EXPOSED BY GLOBALIZATION:
CHOOSING AMONG STRATEGIES OF AVOIDANCE,
COOPERATION, AND INTRUSION TO ESCAPE AN ERA OF
MISGUIDED "NEW FEDERALISM"
Matthew Schaefer
I. INTRODUCION
Numerous commentators claim that globalization is injuring U.S. feder-
alism.' However, it is the strategies that governments in the United States are
pursuing in response to globalization that are diminishing the values of fed-
eralism rather than any aspect of globalization itself.
Globalization is an undeniable phenomenon that encompasses many
changes in the world. Two of the most significant changes are increased trade
and investment flows between nations2 and increased non-economic contacts
between peoples in different nations. The increased trade and investment is
facilitated by international trade and investment agreements as well as im-
proved communications and transportation facilities. Technological ad-
vancements in communications and transportation have also lead to the in-
creased non-economic contacts, both direct and indirect, between peoples in
different nations. Citizens of one nation have much greater information on
the conditions and lives of citizens of other nations today than at any time
* Matthew Schaefer is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska
College of Law. He holds a B.A. from the University of Chicago, and a J.D. and LL.M. from
the University of Michigan. The author thanks Professor John Jackson, Georgetown Law
Center, for guidance throughout his SJ.D. research, some of which is utilized in this Article.
The author also benefited from discussions with Professor Joel Trachtman regarding the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. All views expressed and all errors are the author's alone.I See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, NAFTA and Federalism in the United States, 5 CONsT. F. 60-
62 (Spring/Summer 1994); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINNESOTA L. REv. 249,
376-77 (1997) (focusing on globalization's manifestation in increased trade and international
trade agreements); Candice Hoke, Arendt, Tushnet, and Lopez: The Philosophical Challenge
Behind Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 903, 914-19
(1997).
2 With respect to trade, see Renato Ruggiero, Overview of Developments in International
Trade and the Trading System, WTO Focus NEwsLrrR, Jan. 1998, at 3. With respect to
investment, see Statement by Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat and Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative Jeffrey Lang on the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, reprinted in INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Feb. 20, 1998, at 17-19.
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previously. This information allows citizens of one nation to care about or
otherwise affiliate with citizens of other nations to a greater extent today.
The U.S. federation is often referred to as a split sovereignty. A federa-
tion divides power vertically between a central government and sub-federal
units. Unlike other forms of decentralized government, federations guarantee
4
some level of autonomy for each level of government. This guarantee is
found in a supreme constitution that is not amendable by either level of gov-
ernment and that is umpired by a supreme court.5 If sovereignty is defined to
refer to the holder of supreme power over a given subject matter, then it fol-
lows that federations could be referred to as split sovereignties. However,
answering questions of constitutional authority are necessary to answer
questions of sovereignty. Yet, it is not always clear whether a government
maintains constitutional authority to act with respect to a given matter. "Grey
areas" in constitutional authority exist. Indeed, grey areas can exist wholly
outside the context of sovereignty and extend to whether sub-federal gov-
ernments have authority to take action in areas in which sovereignty resides
in the federal government, but the federal government has not acted. Addi-
tionally, even when a government at a particular level maintains sovereignty
over a given subject matter, it may face severe political constraints in exer-
cising that sovereignty. The areas in which a government is hesitant to exer-
cise the full extent of its sovereignty as a result of political constraints can be
referred to as "yellow zones" (read: proceed with great caution).
Globalization is exposing grey areas and yellow zones in the U.S. split
sovereignty to a certain degree. In response to these exposures, governments
at both the federal and state level can pursue various strategies. Specifically,
in response to exposed grey areas and yellow zones, governments can pursue
strategies of avoidance, cooperation, or intrusion. This Article poses the
question of whether the strategies pursued by governments in response to this
exposure are appropriate in light of the values a federal system of govern-
ment seeks to promote. In particular, this Article will examine and critique
the following strategies: 1) the strategy pursued by the U.S. federal govern-
ment during the negotiation of international trade and investment agreements
seeking further liberalization of trade and investment policies maintained by
sub-federal governments; and 2) the strategy pursued by state governments in
3 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 115 S.Ct. 1842, 1972 (1995) (Kennedy, J.
concurring) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty").
4 See DANIEL ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 23 (1987); Martin Redish,
Constitutionalizing Federalism: A Foundational Analysis, 23 OHIO N. U..L. REV. 1237, 1240
(1997).
5 See TASK FORCE ON CANADIAN UNITY, COMING TO TERMS: THE WORDS OF THE DEBATE,
at 4 (Feb. 1979). See also STEPHAN Kux, SOVIET FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
7 (Inst. for East-West Security Studies, 1990).
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engaging in foreign affairs in an era of increased trade, information, commu-
nication, transportation, and corresponding affiliation between peoples in
various nations.
The analysis and critique of the U.S. federal and state government strate-
gies reveal that the United States is in danger of adopting a misguided notion
of "new federalism." The strategies pursued by the governments in the
United States preserve and promote the autonomy of states in a manner that
allows for policies creating negative externalities, beggar-thy-neighbor poli-
cies, and other sub-optimal policies arising out of prisoner's dilemma-type
situations. Moreover, the strategies preserve state autonomy in a manner that
does not lead to greater public participation in democracy or useful experi-
mentation. In short, the strategies chosen by the governments in the United
States do not promote the values of federalism. A brief comparative exami-
nation of strategies pursued by the Canadian governments supports this con-
clusion. Indeed, the comparison yields what will likely be surprising results
to many observers. The U.S. federal government has arguably been less ag-
gressive in constraining sub-federal government protectionism vis d vis Can-
ada and U.S. states are arguably more aggressive than their provincial coun-
• 6terparts in establishing foreign policies. Accordingly, the governments in the
United States must undertake a re-examination of their current strategies.
Such a re-examination should occur in the context of implementing a model
for a "new federalism" that focuses on the values a federal system of gov-
ernment seeks to promote rather than allowing federalism to be a mere slo-
gan or rhetorical device. Successful implementation of such a model will
require conscientious politicians that not only assess the constitutionality of
their actions but, in addition, assess the impact of their actions on the values
of federalism.
Part II of this Article discusses the lack of serious consideration of the
values of federalism in the current politics of "new federalism." It argues that
conscientious politicians should weigh the values of federalism before taking
action with respect to a given matter. Part III defines grey areas and yellow
zones in the context of split sovereignty and explores their relationship. Part
IV identifies the grey areas and yellow zones present in U.S. federalism. Part
V analyzes the various strategies that can be adopted by federal and state
governments in response to grey areas and yellow zones exposed by global-
6 1 am not arguing that the Canadian government has achieved greater liberalization at
the sub-federal level than the U.S. government. Rather, the strategy pursued by the Canadian
federal government is arguably more aggressive in light of the significant grey areas that
government faces in negotiating and implementing trade agreements.
7 See Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STANFORD L. Rnv. 585 (1974).
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ization. Part VI critiques the actual strategy adopted by the U.S. federal gov-
ernment with respect to the negotiation of international trade agreements.
Part VII critiques the strategy chosen by state governments with respect to
engaging in foreign affairs. Part VIII briefly compares the strategies of gov-
ernments in Canada to highlight the misguided "new federalism" apparent in
the strategies of U.S. governments. Part IX concludes that the U.S. federal
and state governments need to modify their strategies adopted in response to
globalization in the context of an overall reassessment of "new federalism."
I. "NEW FEDERALISM" RENEWED: RHETORIC, VALUES, AND THE
CONSCIENTIOUS POLITICIAN
Since the adoption of the wide federal programs under the "New Deal"
engineered by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the 1930s, various
8U.S. presidents have proposed returning power to the states. Most prominent
was President Ronald Reagan's call for a "new federalism" that would de-
volve power to the states.9 Demands for devolution of certain Yowers to the
states have returned with great force within the past few years.
Despite this renewed call for a "new federalism," there is little careful
consideration by politicians of whether the values of federalism are promoted
by federal or state action with respect to a given matter."1 As a result, "new
federalism" risks devolving authority to the states or preserving state auton-
omy in instances in which the values of federalism are not promoted. The
U.S. Constitution does not explicitly require politicians at various levels of
government to weigh the values of federalism when deciding whether to act
on a given issue. However, the failure of politicians to do so conscientiously
is leading to a diminution in the benefits that a federal system was intended
to bring to those governed. While one frequently hears of federalism in po-
litical debates, politicians often use federalism as a rhetorical tool to argue
for their underlying policy objectives (or perhaps the objectives of special
interest groups) rather than in the context of a debate over whether the values
of federalism will be promoted by a particular action.
12
8 See John Kincaid, The New Federalism Context of the New Judicial Federalism, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 913 (1995).
9 See id.; Rena Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the "New (New)
Federalism": Devolution, Revolution, or Reform, 81 MINN. L. REv. 97, 124-30 (1996).
10 See Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional Moment? Lopez as Constitutional
Theory, 46 CASE W. REs.. L. REv. 845, 848-50 (1996) (discussing the Contract with America
and related demands for a devolution of power to state governments).
I Friedman, Valuing Federalism, supra note 1.
12 Norman Redlich & David Lurie, Federalism: A Surrogate for What Really Matters, 23
OHION. U. L. REV. 1273 (1997).
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poliica S~e t~ 13 .. .. 14Poltical scientistS, political economists, institutional economists, and
the Constitution's Founders' 5 have enumerated the primary considerations
that must be weighed in achieving the appropriate balance between federal
regulation and state autonomy in a federal system of government. The bene-
fits of state autonomy in a federal system include greater public participation
in democracy, providing laboratories for experimentation,' 7 and allowing
maximization of different preference sets of various territorial populations.
The benefits of constraining state autonomy and promoting federal action
include avoiding _policies leading to negative externalities,1' beggar-thy-
neighbor policies, and other sub-optimal policies arising out of prisoner's
21dilemma-type situations. In deciding whether federal regulation or state
autonomy is appropriate with respect to a given issue, politicians must con-
scientiously consider and weigh the values of federalism. Since conscientious
politicians at the federal and state level may disagree after weighing the val-
ues of federalism, an overall reassessment will need to occur. Politicians are
less likely to conduct self-interested weighing with respect to particular mat-
ters if they know that numerous areas of regulation will be reassessed simul-
taneously or in close succession since an honest reassessment will likely
point to devolution of power to the states in some areas and elevation of
power to the federal government in other areas. In other words, "trade-offs"
in matters regulated by federal and state governments can occur in an overall
reassessment to promote the values of federalism. Without the possibility of
trade-offs, politicians (even conscientious ones) may be tempted to conduct a
13 See, e.g., ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM, supra note 4, at 84-103 (1987).
14 Joel Trachtman writings apply institutional economic theory to questions of the
vertical and horizontal division of authority in governments. See, e.g., Joel Trachtman,
Reflections on the Nature of the State: Sovereignty, Power, and Responsibility, 20 CAN.-U.S.
W. 399 (1994) [hereinafter Trachtman I]; Joel Trachtman, International Regulatory
Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INTIL L.J. 47 (1993) [hereinafter
Trachtman 1M.
is See Michael McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating The Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1484, 1493-1500 (1987).
16 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 1, at 389-90.
17 See, e.g., id., at 397-98.
18 See Trachtman I, supra note 14, at 413; Trachtman II, supra note 14, at 100-03.
19 See Friedman, supra note 1, at 407.
20 A beggar-thy-neighbor policy is a policy instituted by a large economic jurisdiction
that, in the short-term, benefits the jurisdiction at the expense of other jurisdictions. However,
since other large jurisdictions respond in kind, such policies ultimately reduce the welfare of
both jurisdictions. The optimal tariff argument is an example of a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
21 See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting From
a Prisoner's Dilemma: The Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the
Appropriateness of a Federal Legislative Response, 28 N. M. L. REv. 303 (1998).
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self-interested weighing of the values of federalism in order to protect their
governmental power.
Why must the politicians engage in a weighing of the values of federal-
ism? Is it not the role of courts to preserve the appropriate federal balance?
Certainly, courts have a role to play and they could engage in careful weigh-
ing of the values of federalism. However, in practice, the courts have shown
little inclination to engage in a weighing of the values of federalism.
23
Moreover, courts cannot be the sole guardians of the values of federalism
because courts face various constraints that the political branches do not.
First, courts appear constrained by doctrinal limits. For instance, courts have
struck down protectionist state regulations and taxes under the dormant
Commerce Clause, but have been unwilling to strike down equally protec-
tionist purchasing and subsidies practices in part because of the history and
language of the Commerce Clause. Second, courts are unable to force the
political branches to affirmatively use their powers when use of such powers
would promote the values of federalism. Courts are simply able to protect the
values of federalism in some instances from injurious incursions by the fed-
eral government and state governments. Third, courts are constrained by
stare decisis. Indeed, stare decisis may prevent courts from adjusting the
federal balance to changed conditions, or increased knowledge of conditions,
that affect the weighing of the values of federalism.24 Lastly, courts are lim-
ited to addressing "cases and controversies" appropriately placed before them
and thus they cannot necessarily reassess numerous regulatory areas at once.
Are there any other possible policemen to ensure that the values of feder-
alism are fully promoted? One might look toward businesses affected by
federal and state regulation. However, businesses lack the proper incentives
to persuade courts and legislatures to undertake a meaningful weighing of the
values of federalism. Businesses bring cases and lobby based on profit mo-
tives, not on the basis of promoting the values of federalism. The profit mo-
tives of businesses may align with the promotion of the values of federalism
in many instances, but certainly not in all instances. Thus, the overall reas-
sessment that is required can only occur with conscientious politicians im-
plementing a "required consideration" model of federalism in which politi-
22 See, e.g., Trachtman II, supra note 14, at 99 (noting in the context of vertical allocation
of powers within the European Community that a "horse trading approach" may be necessary).
23 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REv. 494, 501-02, 524-
25 (1995); Friedman, supra note 1, at 318-19.
24 See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VANDERBILT L. REv. 1488, 1499-
1500 (1994).
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cians are required to carefully weigh the values of federalism before acting
on a given issue.2 s
As in all matters, the conscientious politician should weigh the values of
federalism when choosing among strategies of avoidance, cooperation, and
intrusion in response to grey areas and yellow zones exposed by globaliza-
tion. However, in practice there is very little consideration of the values of
federalism when formulating these strategies. Before examining the risks and
rewards of various strategies with regard to the values of federalism, it is
necessary to further analyze grey areas and yellow zones in the context of
split sovereignty and to identify the current grey areas and yellow zones of
U.S. federalism.
III. GREY AREAS AND YELLOW ZONES: DEFINED, RELATED, AND
DISTINGUISHED IN THE CONTEXT OF SOVEREIGNTY, AUTHORITY, AND THE
EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY
Sovereignty can be defined as the holder of supreme power over a given
matter.2 In federations, such as the United States, sovereignty so defined is
divided between the federal government and state governments. However,
the sovereignty, or supreme power, of the federal government is not in ques-
tion in those matters in which it has constitutional authority to act. The Su-
premacy Clause of the constitution makes federal law supreme to state law.27
Thus, the question of whether the federal government maintains constitu-
tional authority to act with respect to a given matter must be answered in
order to determine which level of government maintains sovereignty over a
given matter. If the federal government has constitutional authority to act,
then it is has supreme power over the matter. If the federal government does
not have constitutional authority to act, then state governments are sovereign
with respect to the matter and indeed enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter. However, questions of authority can arise outside the context of sov-
ereignty. In certain areas where the federal government has authority to act
(and thus has sovereignty) but has failed to do so, it must be determined
whether states have authority to act until the federal government exercises its
supreme power. If it is determined that states have authority to act in such a
25I borrow the idea (and the term) '!required consideration" model from Martin H.
Redish, Constitutionalizing Federalism: A Foundational Analysis, 23 OHIO N. U. L. REv.
1237 (1997).
26 See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, National Review of WTO Dispute Settlement Panel
Reports: In the Name of Sovereignty or Enhanced WTO Rule Compliance?, 11 ST. JOHN J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 307, 329-33 (1996) (discussing various definitions of sovereignty in the
context of international trade agreements).
27 U.S. CONST., art VI.
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situation, then concurrent jurisdiction of the federal and state governments
exists. If states have no authority to act in such an instance, then the federal
government enjoys exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.
Thus, questions of authority are important to determine sovereignty and
to determine areas of exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction. However, the
constitutional authority of a government to take action with respect to a given
matter can be unclear. These areas can be referred to as "grey areas." Grey
areas can be "one way" phenomenon such that action by one level of gov-
ernment in an area is clearly allowed, but legal authority for action by the
other level of government is uncertain.
Maintaining constitutional authority to act does not necessarily mean a
government is politically able to act. Yellow zones represent those areas in
which a government has clear legal authority to act, but faces political limi-
tations in exercising such authority. As with grey areas, yellow zones can be
"one way" phenomenon that affect only one level of government. Grey areas
can be considered a sub-set of all yellow zones since action within a grey
area is likely to be politically difficult in addition to having uncertain legal
authority.
Yet, it is important to further distinguish grey areas and yellow zones in
order to understand the complex interaction that can exist between the two.
Changed politics alone can eliminate a yellow zone. In contrast, grey areas of
split sovereignty can frequently be resolved by the courts alone. However, in
some instances, the situation is somewhat more complex than this distinction
between grey areas and yellow zones. Sometimes federal government action
can resolve a grey area. This can occur in an area in which the federal gov-
ernment has clear authority to act, state government authority to act is un-
clear, and federal action with respect to the matter will preempt the state ac-
tion as a result of the Supremacy Clause. But, preemptive federal action with
respect to the matter may fall within a yellow zone. In such instances, elimi-
nating the yellow zone inhibiting federal action can also eliminate the grey
area that exists with respect to state action. In such instances, the grey area is
resolved without the aid of the courts.
[Vol. 24.35 1998
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IV. IDENTIFICATION OF GREY AREAS AND YELLOW ZONES IN U.S.
FEDERALISM
A. Grey Areas of Authority with Regard to External Affairs
The U.S. Supreme Court has often described the power of the U.S. fed-
eral government over foreign affairs as "exclusive, despite the fact that the
Constitution does not grant a general foreign affairs power. Indeed, the U.S.
Constitution does not mention the term "foreign affairs. '49 Instead, the Con-
stitution grants branches of the federal government certain powers related to
foreign affairs while denying other such powers to the states. The Constitu-
tion grants the President the power to enter into treaties and the power to
appoint ambassadors with varying levels of advice and consent of the
Senate, 30 and declares the President to be commander-in chief of the armed
forces.3 ' The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate foreign
commerce, declare war, and define and punish crimes against the law of na-
tions. 2 Correspondingly, the Constitution prohibits the states from entering
into treaties. It further prohibits states, without the consent of Congress,
from laying duties on imports or exports, keeping troops, or entering into any
agreement or compact with a foreign power.34 Grey areas with respect to
foreign affairs powers arise out of difficulties in interpreting the explicit
grants and denials of authority as well as the failure of the constitution to
grant a general foreign affairs power. The analysis below looks first at the
grey areas involved in the interpretation of a few explicit clauses and then at
the more general grey area implicating state foreign affairs legislation.
1. Interpreting the Compacts and Agreement Clause
Practice, court decisions, and Congressional documents indicate that not
all agreements and compacts are covered by the constitutional clause that
prohibits states from entering into agreements or compacts with foreign pow-
2 U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,233 (1942). See also U.S. v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937);
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,317 (1936).
29 Contrast the U.S. Constitution's failure to grant a general foreign affairs power with the
Australian Constitution that grants the Parliament the power to legislate with respect to
"foreign affairs." See AusTR. CONST., § 51(29).30 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2 (entering into treaties requires the consent of two-thirds of the
Senate; appointing Ambassadors requires the consent of a simple majority of Senators).
31 See id.
32 See id., art. I, § 8.
33 See id., art. I, § 10.
34 See id.
9
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ers without the consent of Congress. 35 The Supreme Court stated earlier in
this century that Congressional assent is not required for all compacts or
agreements entered into by the states, only those that tend to "increase the
powers of the states or to encroach upon the just supremacy of the United
,,36States. This contrasts with the view taken by at least four justices on the
Supreme Court in the mid-1800s that all agreements whether written or oral
would require Congressional consent.37 During this century, the federal gov-
ernment has also apparently relaxed its interpretation of the new standard.38
Indeed, hundreds of agreements exist between U.S. states and Canadian
provinces that have not received Congressional approval. 39 But what exactly
does the standard "increase the power of the states or encroach upon the just
supremacy of the United States" encompass? It seems clear that an agree-
ment between a state and a foreign government (or sub-federal government
in a foreign country) that was intended to be binding under international law
would require Congressional consent under this standard. However, an ex-
amination of agreements receiving Congressional approval indicate that the
standard must capture additional types of agreements. Indeed, most agree-
ments receiving Congressional approval deal-with relatively mundane topics,
including the construction of a highway bridge, establishment of an authority
to operate a highway bridge, and cooperation on forest fires.42 Nonetheless,
one agreement, the Great Lakes Basin Compact, did raise significant issues.43
Congressional approval of the compact did not extend to original provisions
35 See S. Doc. 232, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. at 366, 368; McHenry County v. Brady, 163
N.W. 540 (N.D. 1917); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 151-156 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2d ed., 1996); Raymond S. Rodgers, The
Capacity of States of the Union to Conclude International Agreements: The Background and
Some Recent Developments, 61 Am. J. INTL L. 1021 (1967).
36 McHenry County, supra note 35, at 541.
37 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 572-74(1840).
38 For example, in the late 1930s, the State Department declared, in response to a question
by the California Department of Motor Vehicles, that an arrangement for reciprocal exemption
of registration and fees with the Mexican territory of Baja would require Congressional
consent. See Hackworth, 5 DIG. OF INT'L L. & PRAC. 24, sec. 464. It is doubtful the federal
government would hold a similar view with respect to such an agreement today. See also John
Kincaid, Constituent Diplomacy: U.S. State Roles in Foreign Affairs, in CONSTITUTIONAL
DESIGN AND POWER SHARING IN THE POST-MODERN EPOCH 107, 118-19 (Daniel Elazar ed.
(1991)).
19 See LUIGI Di MARzo, COMPONENT UNITS OF FEDERAL STATES AND INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS 82-84 (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980); Kincaid, supra note 38, at 131-32.
40 McHenry County, supra note 35, at 541.
41 Although he does not explicitly so state, I find Professor Henkin's views in accord with
this statement. See Henkin, supra note 35, at 155.
42 See id. at 153.
43 Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419 (1968).
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of the compact that would have given the commission established by the
compact the power to recommend treaties between federal governments and
cooperate with foreign governments or subdivisions on environmental and
other matters. 44 The scant court opinions and the practice of governments in
applying the standard leaves the area shaded in grey.
The wording of the agreements and compacts clause also opens another
grey area: to what extent can states engage in negotiations with foreign pow-
ers? Some commentators have argued that states can engage in negotiations
with a foreign power since there are no explicit limits in the Constitution on
negotiations between a state and a foreign power.45 Since states can enter into
agreements, these commentators presume that states can negotiate an agree-
ment prior to receiving Congressional approval. But can it be plausibly ar-
gued that a state could begin negotiating with a foreign government on any
topic, for example, negotiate with India and Pakistan on the banning of nu-
clear tests? Of course, existing federal statutes may prohibit state officials
from engaging in such conduct,46 but it may be that such limits would exist
from the very structure of the Constitution. Nonetheless, states have entered
into numerous agreements with the Canadian provinces prior to or without
Congressional approval, and thus, ipso facto they have entered into negotia-
tions with Canadian provinces without receiving Congressional approval.
Regional governors' associations, such as the Western Governors Associa-
tion and the Border State Governors, also have discussions with their Cana-
dian provincial and Mexican state counterparts at meetings and conferences.
As with agreements themselves, the lack of court opinions and the practice of
governments leaves the area of negotiations shrouded in some grey.
2. Power of the President to Appoint Ambassadors
Another grey area arising out of a specific clause relates to the power
granted to the President to appoint ambassadors. In spite of this clause,
nearly all states have established overseas trade and investment offices and
state governors routinely lead trade missions to foreign countries accompa-
nied by in-state business interests.4 7 However, most of the investment offices
44 Id., sec. 2.
45 Michael Shuman, Dateline Mainstreet: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FOREIGN
POL'Y 158, 163 (1992).
46 Logan Act, 18 U.S.C § 953 (prohibiting any citizen, including presumably a state
official, without authority of the United States from carrying on "correspondence or
intercourse with any foreign government... with intent to influence the measures or conduct
of any foreign government.. . in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United
States, or defeat the measures of the United States").
47 NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASW'N, GOING GLOBAL: A GOVERNOR'S GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1992).
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and trade missions can be considered "in-person advertising" that primarily
focus on information exchange and establishing business contacts. Such of-
fices and missions generally do not focus on seeking a change in the invest-
ment, trade, or other public policies of foreign governments. As such it is
unlikely that such activities interfere with the President's powers to appoint
Ambassadors. However, no court case has dealt with the federalism dimen-
sions of this clause.
3. Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
A wider-band grey area exists outside the interpretation of specific
clauses of the Constitution explored above. While there is no dispute that the
federal government's powers over foreign affairs are plenary and supreme, a
dispute exists as to whether and to what extent such powers are exclusive
with respect to matters that the states are not explicitly prohibited by the
Constitution from undertaking. In other words, there is controversy over
whether and to what extent there is what might be called a "dormant foreign
affairs doctrine" that prevents the states, evep in the absence of federal gov-
ernment action preempting the states, from enacting legislation with either a
foreign policy motive or a direct effect on U.S. foreign relations. 48 Specifi-
cally, there is a question whether the default rule should be that states have
authority to legislate with respect to foreign affairs until the federal govern-
ment acts to preempt such legislation or that states cannot act in such in-
stances even in the absence of an affirmative federal pronouncement (e.g.,
where the federal government is utilizing quiet diplomacy or pressure in in-
ternational organizations). Additionally, questions arise depending on the
default rule established. If the default rule is that states maintain authority to
act until the federal government acts, the question arises as to whether the
federal act must explicitly preempt the state activity or the existence of a
federal act itself should by implication preempt state activity. If the default
rule is that states cannot act even in the absence of a federal pronouncement,
the question arises whether only state regulation should be covered by such a
default rule or market participant activity of a state (i.e., procurement and
subsidies) should also be covered.
48 See Zschemig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1969) (adopting, or seeming to adopt, an effects
test for such a doctrine, but containing language that would support motive review as well).
See also Richard Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INTL L.
821, 825-26 (1989) (noting that "scholars and judges have continued to puzzle over
[Zschernig's] reasoning and scope, and, in particular, over precisely where and how the courts
should draw the line between constitutionally permissible and prohibited state and local
action"). Henkin, supra note 35, at 165 ("One would be bold to predict that [Zschemig] has a
future life . . ."). The existence of such a doctrine has recently been criticized. See Jack
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv. 1617 (1997).
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In the 1968 Zschernig case,49 the Supreme Court appeared to formulate a
default rule that states could not act in a manner that unduly interfered with
foreign affairs even in the absence of preemptive federal legislation. Several
lower courts have relied on the doctrine in striking down state statutes, but• • • 50
the Supreme Court has never revisited the doctrine. The doctrine has come
under increasing criticism and, in any event, is surrounded by considerable
51
uncertainty.
B. Grey Areas of Authority With Regard to Internal Affairs
The U.S. Constitution grants certain enumerated powers to federal gov-
ernment. The 10th Amendment of the Constitution, in turn, reserves all
power to the states and the people that is not delegated to the federal gov-
ernment. The most significant or expansive power granted to the federal gov-
ernment is the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 2 Since the
1930s the Supreme Court has recognized that the federal government can
regulate matters with a significant effect on interstate and foreign
commerce.5 3 However, at various times over the past several decades the
Supreme Court has sought to impose outer limits on the use of the commerce
power. In establishing these outer limits, the Court has often referred to the
10th Amendment and, on other occasions, to the federal structure of govern-
ment created by the Constitution. The first such attempt occurred in the mid-
1970s. a The Court held in National League of Cities that the federal gov-
ernment could not act against the states in a manner "that would impair the
states' ability to function effectively in the federal system."55 Specifically,
the federal government could not interfere with the integral government
functions of state bodies providing traditional government services.56 How-
ever, the Court abandoned the National League of Cities doctrine in the mid-
1980s due to frustration over applying its standard. The Court held in Garcia
that the political process itself provided sufficient protection of state auton-
49 See Zschernig, supra note 48.
50 See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm. of L.A. Dept. of Water & Power,
276 Cal. App.2d 227 (Cal. App. 1969); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson,, 503
N.E.2d 300 (l. 1986).
51 See Bilder, supra note 48 (questioning the scope of the doctrine); Goldsmith, supra
note 48 (criticizing the doctrine).
52 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
53 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
54 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
55 National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852 (citing Fry, 421 U.S. at 547, n.7).
56 Id. at 851.
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omy within the Constitution. 7 This decade the Court has once again sought
to establish judicially imposed outer limits on Congress' commerce power. In
New York v. United States and Printz, the Court stated that Congress could
not commandeer state legislatures to enact, or state executive official to en-
force, federal regulatory programs.5 In Lopez, the Court sought to rein in use
of the commerce power to regulate activities not of a commercial nature and
only having an impact on interstate commerce through an attenuated chain of
events. 59 The doctrines established by these cases, Lopez in particular, await
further definition. In the interim, Congress faces a narrow-band of grey re-
garding use of its commerce power.
In terms of implementing international agreements, the Supreme Court
ruled in Missouri v. Holland earlier in this century that the federal govern-
ment could pass legislation to implement a treaty even if it did not have the
power to pass the legislation in the absence of the treaty. 60 Senator Bricker of
Ohio led a movement in the early 1950s to amend the Constitution so as to
change this rule of Missouri v. Holland.61 However, his effort failed. Thus,
judicially imposed outer limits may not apply to legislation implementing a
treaty. However, treaties requiring two-thirds approval by the Senate are not
the only constitutional method for the United States to enter into an interna-
tional agreement. 62 Some international agreements are approved by a simple
majority of both houses of Congress relying on Congressional power to
regulate foreign trade and to make all laws necessary and proper for execut-
ing that power.63 In contrast to treaties, it is likely that judicially imposed
outer limits would apply to Congressional-Executive agreements.
64
Other narrow limits on federal government's power to implement treaties
or enact federal legislation exist and some of these limits possess a grey hue.
57 Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
58 New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. U.S., 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997).
59 U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
60 252 U.S. 416 (1920)
61 See John Whitton & Edward Fowler, Bricker Amendment-Fallacies and Dangers, 48
AM. J. INTL L. 23 (1954); Thomas Burgenthal, The U.S. and International Human Rights, 9
HUM. RIGHTs L.J. 141, 145-47 (1988). Under section 2 of the Bricker Amendment, a treaty
would become "effective as internal law of the U.S. only through legislation that would be
valid in the absence of a treaty." Sen. Rep. 412 accompanying S.J.Res. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953).
62 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 303(2)
(1987); John Jackson, United States, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC LAw (Francis
Jacobs & Shelly Roberts eds. (1987)).
63 See id. See also Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108
HARV. L. REv. 799 (1995).
64 See Matthew Schaefer, The 21" Century Trade Negotiator's Guide to Late 2 0 'h Century
U.S. Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence (article on file with author).
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For instance, the 21' Amendment provides that "the transportation or im-
portation into any State... for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." The purpose behind
this amendment was to allow states to regulate the "time, manner and place"
of the delivery and sale of alcoholic beverages, but not to protect the local
alcoholic beverage industry. Accordingly, the limits the 21st Amendment
places on the federal government's power are quite narrow.6 However, since
Supreme Court jurisprudence under the 21 St Amendment has focused on tax
matters, there is at least some grey over the exact extent of federal authority
with respect to non-tax matters such as distribution.
C. Yellow Zones in the Exercise of Authority
The yellow zones in the U.S. federation are more easily analyzed. One
might go so far as to claim in the current political climate that any federal
action that limits existing levels of state autonomy falls within a yellow zone.
Proposals for a "Conference of the States" focusing on a return of power to
the states and certain proposals in the Republican Congress' "Contract With
America" are indications that federal action that constrains existing state
autonomy is becoming increasingly difficult politically. If one finds this
claim somewhat exaggerated, and one could likely find recent examples to
the contrary, it is undoubtedly the case that the federal government faces a
yellow zone in terms of limiting state autonomy through international agree-
ments66 and limiting state fiscal policies, such as taxation, procurement, and
subsidies.
V. STRATEGIES OF AVOIDANCE, COOPERATION, AND INTRUSION: RISKS AND
REWARDS IN TERMS OF THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM.
When an element of globalization exposes a grey area or yellow zone in
the split sovereignty of a federation, governments can respond with three
general strategies: avoidance, cooperation, or intrusion. Each strategy pur-
65 Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 716 (1984); Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468
U.S. 263, 276 (1984).
66 This Article focuses on international trade agreements. For a discussion of federal
hesitancy in constraining states through international human rights agreements and possible
solutions to overcoming the problem, see Peter Spiro, The States and International Human
Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567 (1997). I should note that the values of federalism carry
different weights in the context of binding state governments to certain international human
rights norms as compared with international trade agreements obligations. The benefits of
state autonomy, including public participation in democracy, serving as laboratories of
experimentation, and maximizing preference sets of non-economic values of different
territorial populations, are potentially threatened more by certain international human rights
norms (e.g., those prohibiting the death penalty) than international trade agreements.
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sued comes with certain risks and rewards for the values of federalism (and
indeed the survival of federalism). The risks and rewards can differ depend-
ing on whether a grey area or yellow zone is implicated. These risks and re-
wards are best identified in specific contexts. Accordingly, the risks and re-
wards in the context of federal government negotiation of international trade
and investment agreements seeking liberalization of sub-federal government
policies and sub-federal government engagement in foreign policy are ex-
amined separately below.
A. Federal Government Negotiation of International Trade and Investment
Agreements
If a federal government pursues a strategy of avoidance in international
trade negotiations, then the autonomy of the sub-federal governments will be
preserved. But autonomy to do what? International trade and investment
agreements prohibit measures that discriminate against foreign goods, serv-
ices, and investments. Thus, an avoidance strategy allows protectionist, beg-
gar-thy-neighbor regulation to persist. There is no need to allow states to
experiment with discriminatory laws since experimentation in the form of
protectionism has been tried and has been proven a failure. Such autonomy
generally does not increase public participation in a democracy since, if pub-
lic choice theory has any descriptive force, protectionist laws generally tend
to result from successful lobbying by concentrated special interests. If inter-
national trade and investment agreements mandated harmonization, then
beneficial aspects of state autonomy would be implicated. Sub-federal gov-
ernments would not be free to experiment with different tax rates or levels of
consumer safety. Sub-federal governments would not be able to maximize
the preference sets of their territorial populations with respect to various
quality-of-life issues. However, international trade and investment agree-
ments currently do not mandate harmonization of tax policies or standards
relating to quality-of-life issues.
A strategy of intrusion by a federal government into yellow zones and
possibly grey areas that are filled with sub-federal government protectionist
policy has the benefit of seeking the elimination of sub-federal autonomy
exercised for protectionist purposes. Sub-federal autonomy is reduced, but
only in a manner that promotes the values of federalism. Action by federal
authorities is appropriate to overcome beggar-thy-neighbor policies. How-
ever, a strategy of intrusion carries the cost of increased intergovernmental
friction. Intergovernmental frictions may be an important consideration be-
cause, in the extreme, such frictions can lead to dissolution of the federation.
Even milder frictions in stable federations with respect to a particular issue
can spoil cooperation between federal and sub-federal governments on other
[Vol. 24.35 1998
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important issues. Moreover, in the case of intrusion into a grey area, a federal
government risks possible clarification of the grey area in favor of sub-
federal governments by the courts. Courts, as noted before, may not rely on a
careful weighing of the values of federalism when making determinations
and clarifying grey areas. The less significant the intrusion, the less likely a
legal challenge leading to clarification will occur. To the extent a grey area is
implicated, the shade of grey will also influence the likelihood of a legal
challenge leading to clarification.
A strategy of cooperation involves a federal government discussing with
sub-federal governments the benefits of reducing sub-federal autonomy to
enact measures that discriminate against foreign goods, services, and invest-
ments and seeking some form of consent from sub-federal governments for
liberalization. A strategy of cooperation between federal and sub-federal
governments could lead to the elimination of beggar-thy-neighbor policies in
a manner that does not cause (significant) friction. To the extent a grey area
is implicated, cooperation also lessens the chances of challenge in the courts.
In addition to minimizing intergovernmental frictions and the possibility of
legal challenges resulting from a unilateral intrusion into a grey area or yel-
low zone, a strategy of cooperation can lead to a significant reduction in sub-
federal autonomy used for protectionist purposes. Indeed, a successful strat-
egy of cooperation may turn a yellow zone into a "green zone." (Read: pro-
ceed with course of action). However, the bargaining that occurs in the con-
text of a cooperation strategy is influenced by the perceived strategy that will
be followed should cooperation fail. Thus, it is important for a federal gov-
ernment to be aware of perceptions maintained by sub-federal governments
regarding the "fallback" strategy of the federal government.
B. State Government Engagement in Foreign Policy
A strategy of intrusion by a sub-federal government with respect to the
grey areas and yellow zones of foreign policy may create a significant risk of
negative externalities. First, any response to a particular sub-federal govern-
ment's foreign policy is likely to affect other sub-federal jurisdictions within
the nation. Although there are examples where foreign nations have targeted
. . ... . . . 67
retaliation against a particular sub-federal jurisdiction, there is no guarantee
that this will occur. Additionally, spill-over effects are likely even if a for-
eign nation attempts to so target its retaliation. Second, the federal govern-
ment's foreign policy may be hindered. This can be true even if a sub-federal
67 See id., at 585-86. I can think of an additional example as well. In the early 1990s, the
United States retaliated against beer brewed and bottled in Ontario when that province refused
to bring its laws into conformity with its GATr obligations.
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government's policy seeks the same ultimate goal as the federal policy since
the federal government presumably will have carefully selected the appropri-
ate scope and degree of measures to achieve the goal. A strategy of intrusion
into a grey area may also lead to clarifications by courts of the grey area to
the detriment of sub-federal governments. Clear action by the federal gov-
ernment of its plenary power over foreign affairs could also eliminate the
grey area, however, action of this type might fall within a yellow zone of
political limitations. Of course, a policy of minimal intrusion by sub-federal
governments is less likely to be subject to court challenge or a federal gov-
ernment response. Additionally, a strategy of intrusion can lead to intergov-
ernmental frictions.
If a sub-federal government pursues a strategy of avoidance in foreign
affairs, then some commentators might argue that the benefits of state auton-
omy, such as greater public participation in democratic rule-making and
serving as laboratories of experimentation, will be diminished. However,
federal foreign policy-making is no longer a very secretive process. In part,
the same technological and communications revolutions that have given sub-
federal policy makers certain information on conditions in foreign countries
are making information available to non-governmental organizations and
citizens groups. These organizations and groups have significant opportuni-
ties to influence the federal government's foreign policy. Experimentation by
sub-federal governments in foreign policy will be unproductive. Such ex-
periments are, in essence, uncontrolled since they are affected by numerous
external factors, including other sub-federal foreign policies, any federal
policy, and the foreign policy of other nations. Additionally, state measures
are likely to be ineffective. Federal government foreign policy measures
themselves can often be ineffective if undertaken unilaterally without support
from other foreign countries. 68 Lastly, the adoption of sub-federal foreign
policy measures may forestall federal government measures to address a for-
eign policy problem by deflecting interest group pressure from the federal
government.
Nevertheless, to the extent citizens groups have greater access to sub-
federal governments and sub-federal governments serve as forums that pro-
duce competing ideas, a cooperation strategy would allow for these compet-
ing ideas to be transmitted to the federal government without the negative
68 See, e.g., Gary Hufbauer & Elizabeth Winston, Smarter Sanctions: Updating the
Economic Weapon, 7 NAT'L STRATEGY REP. 1-5 (Summer 1997) ("We suggest... guidelines
for U.S. policy makers who find themselves considering the imposition of sanctions: recognize
that sanctions alone - even severe sanctions - stand a low probability of achieving most foreign
policy objectives, limit the frequency of sanctions applications by insisting on multilateral
measures wherever possible . . ."). See also GARY HUFBAUER, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED (Inst. for Int'l. Econ., 2d ed., (1990)).
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externalities resulting from a policy of intrusion. If a strategy of cooperation
is pursued, intergovernmental frictions are reduced and the effectiveness of
policy measures can be enhanced, for instance, if the federal government
authorizes sub-federal governments to join in a sanctions regime against a
foreign government.
C. Strategies Promoting the Values of Federalism Compared with Actual
Strategies Adopted
The above analysis indicated that a federal government policy of avoid-
ance with respect to negotiating international trade and investment agree-
ments would be the most damaging to the values of federalism. The exami-
nation also indicated that a sub-federal government's policy of intrusion with
respect to foreign policy would be most damaging to the values of federal-
ism. Unfortunately, as the analysis below reveals, the federal and state gov-
ernments in the United States are increasingly utilizing the strategies that are
most damaging to the values of federalism.
VI. U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT NEGOTIATIONS SEEKING TO CONSTRAIN SUB-FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT POLICIES
A. The Federal-State Clause of GATT 1947: Strategy of Avoidance or In-
trusion?
The GATT 1947, which was the primary international trade agreement
governing trade-in-goods until it was replaced by an updated and revised
GATT 1994, contained a "federal-state clause." Through insertion of the
clause, federal states sought to relieve themselves from responsibility for at
least some violations committed by their sub-federal governments. To deter-
mine the extent to which the clause absolved federal governments from re-
sponsibility, it is necessary to distinguish between federal-state clauses util-
izing a narrow "constitutional test" and those utilizing a broader "appropri-
ateness test."'69 A federal-state clause with a "constitutional test" only re-
lieves a federal government of responsibility in those instances in which it
did not have the constitutional power to ensure sub-federal compliance. In
contrast, a federal-state clause with an "appropriateness test" relieves the
federal government from responsibility in all areas in which federal action to
69 Covey T. Oliver, Enforcement of Treaties by a Federal State, in 1974-I RECUEIL DEs
COURS 377, 406 (1974); Francis Maupain, Federalism and International Labour Conventions,
126 INT'L LABOUR REV. 625, 638 (1987). For an example of a "federal-state clause" with an
appropriateness test, see CONST. INT'L LABOR ORG., art. 19(7).
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ensure compliance would not be appropriate having regard for the traditional
use of federal powers in the area. The GATT 1947's "federal-state clause,"
found in Article XXIV(12), utilized a constitutional test.
However, by utilizing such a test, federal-states, including the United
States, essentially deferred selection of a strategy regarding grey areas to
GATT dispute settlement panels. When disputes arose concerning sub-
federal measures and federal authority to preempt the measures fell within a
grey area, dispute settlement panels were left in the uncomfortable dilemma
of attempting to independently assess the constitutional divisions of authority
in grey areas or simply accepting the federal government's representation as
to its authority. Depending on the approach of a dispute settlement panel, the
federal-state clause could serve as a strategy of intrusion into a grey area or
merely as a strategy of avoidance.
Several dispute settlement cases involving Canadian provincial practices
and one case involving U.S. state practices forced GATT dispute settlement
panels to face the question of the applicability of GATT's federal-state clause
in grey areas.70 The various panels differed in the extent to which they made
judgments independent of the challenged government on the constitutional
division of powers in grey areas.71 However, in the last of the line of cases,
the so-called Beer II case involving a Canadian retaliatory complaint against
the United States regarding state practices affecting the marketing and distri-
bution of alcohol, the GATT panel did delve into an extensive analysis of the
division of powers under the U.S. Constitution, including a grey area re-
garding the relationship between the Commerce Clause and the 21st Amend-
ment. In particular, the panel extended findings of the U.S. Supreme Court
regarding that relationship in the context of taxation to non-tax measures,
including measures dealing with distribution. The panel found that the fed-
eral government maintained authority to legislate with respect to all measures
involved in the case, including those dealing with distribution. As a result, a
non-cooperative strategy of intrusion occurred since states were not exten-
sively consulted during the negotiation of the GATT in the mid-1940s nor
70 Canada-Taxation of Gold Coins, GATT Doe. 15863 (1985) [unadopted] (panel
concluded that Article XXIV(12) "applies only to those [local government measures] which
the federal government cannot control because [the matter] falls outside its jurisdiction under
the constitutional distribution of powers"); Canada-Measures Related to Alcoholic Beverages,
35th Supp. BISD 37 (1988); Canada-Import, Distribution, and Sale of Certain Alcoholic
Drinks by Provincial Marketing Agencies, 39th Supp. BISD 206 (1992); United States-
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, 39th Supp. BISD 206 (1992) [hereinafter
Beer 11].
71 See id.
72 The panel also examined these issues in considering whether the Protocol of
Provisional Application (PPA) exempted state measures existing prior to 1947 from GATT
obligations. See Beer II, supra note 70, at 11 5.44-5.48, 5.78-5.80.
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during the actual Beer II dispute in the early 1990s. As a result of the strategy
of non-cooperative intrusion, federal-state frictions were created and the im-
plementation of the panel report by the states has been quite limited. States
continue to maintain many measures that the panel found to violate GATT
obligations.73 A more significant role for the states during the dispute settle-
ment process may have lead to greater implementation of the panel report.74
B. Current U.S. Federal Government Strategies
1. Revised Federal-state Clause of GATT 1994 and New Dispute Set-
tlement Jurisprudence Under the GATT 1994: Strategy of Minimal
Intrusion in Grey Areas and Yellow Zones
Numerous U.S. trading partners sought and succeeded in negotiating a
change to GATT's federal-state clause during the Uruguay Round multilat-
eral trade negotiations which concluded in 1994. 7 (Unitary states disliked
the clause believing it lead to an imbalance in obligations between them-
selves and federal states). Specifically, the GATT 1994's Article XXIV(12)
makes federal states fully responsible for violations of the GATT 1994 by
76their sub-federal governments. The new Article XXIV(12) also adds that
provisions relating to suspension of concessions and compensation apply
where sub-federal compliance is not achieved.77 The changes to Article
XXIV(12) essentially remove the need for panels to delve into grey areas of
the constitutional law of federations in order to determine responsibility for
sub-federal violation. While obviously benefiting unitary states by removing
the imbalance in obligations, the new Article XXIV(12) is also a benefit to
federal states since panels are unlikely to find it necessary to engage in con-
stitutional interpretations in grey areas. For the United States, agreeing to the
new Article XXIV(12) was nearly or entirely cost free. The old GATT's fed-
eral state clause did not relieve the United States from responsibility for any
obligations. The only grey area GAT obligations might implicate relates to
the 21st Amendment and the Beer II panel already ruled that the federal-state
clause did not operate to relieve the federal government from responsibility
73 See Matthew Schaefer, Are Private Remedies in Domestic Courts Essential for
International Trade Agreements to Serve Constitutional Functions?, 17 Nw. J. INTL L. 609,
645-46 (1996/97).
74 Id. at 646-47.
75 See Matthew Schaefer, Searching for Pareto Gains in the Relationship Between Free
Trade and Federalism: Revisiting the NAFTA, Eyeing the FTAA, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 441, 464
(1997).
76 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATr 1994, 911 13-15,
reprinted in 33 LL.M. 1161-63 (1994).
'n Id.
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in this area. Thus, the minimal intrusion by the federal government in the
grey area created by the 2 1St Amendment had, in essence, already occurred as
a result of the Beer II case.
However, a yellow zone is also implicated by GATT 1994 obligations.
Most of the state autonomy restricted through the GATT was already re-
stricted as a matter of constitutional law under the dormant Commerce
Clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the allocation of the com-
merce power to the federal government to serve not only as enabling the fed-
eral government to legislate with respect to economic activities having a sig-
nificant effect on interstate and foreign commerce, but also as disabling the
states from enacting legislation that discriminates against or unduly burdens
interstate or foreign commerce.7s Thus, even if the federal government re-
fused to bind the states to the GATT, the states would face constraints on
protectionist actions. Nonetheless, the anti-protectionism norms of the GATT
probably differ to a small degree from those under the dormant Commerce
Clause. Any movement beyond the dormant Commerce Clause in the context
of an international trade agreement constitutes a yellow zone for the federal
government. Numerous state interests balk at being subject to anti-
protectionism constraints outside the dormant Commerce Clause. Thus, to
the extent that GATT constraints differ from those of the dormant Commerce
Clause, the federal government intruded into a yellow zone.
Yet, the comparison between the constraints of the dormant Commerce
Clause and GATT is made difficult due to differences in opinion over what
analytical method U.S. courts are truly utilizing in dormant Commerce
Clause cases. The Supreme Court has developed a virtual per se rule of inva-
lidity for facially discriminatory statutes79 and appears, on the surface of its
opinions, to apply a balancing test for non-facially discriminatory statutes. 8"
In the balancing test, the Court weighs the protectionist effects of a law
against the achievement of legitimate local purposes under the law.81 How-
ever, there are persuasive arguments that the Courts' balancing language is
mere window dressing and that, underneath the language, courts are actually
searching for a protectionist motive. Courts may be hesitant to formally and
explicitly find that a state legislature has acted with an impermissible protec-
78 JOHN NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 281-318 (West 5th ed.,
(1995)).
79 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
80 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
81 See id.
82 See Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986).
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tionist motive, hence the window dressing.83 Under this theory, the use of
balancing is ultimately an attempt to snuff out a protectionist motive.
84
In contrast, the GATT test appears more formalistic with an explicit text
for its constraints. This may be particularly true since WTO dispute settle-
ment panels are directed to use customary international law rules of inter-
pretation that place primary emphasis on the text of treaty obligations.
85
Nonetheless, it is quite possible that GATT panels are influenced by the ap-
parent Xrotectionist motive (or lack thereof) behind the measures they ex-
amine. GATT's national treatment obligations require that a state treat a
product from Member countries "no less favorably" that an in-state "like
product" with respect to domestic regulations and that a state not tax a for-
eign "like product" in excess of its domestic c.ounterpart.8 One study in 1994
found a remarkable similarity in approach between dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and GATT's approach.88 However, that study was made
during the time of the so-called "aims and effects" test for determining like
products. Under the aims and effects test, products are not "like" if an origin-
neutral regulatory distinction between the products does not have the aim or
effect of affording protection.89 The aims and effects test made review under
GATT's national treatment obligation quite similar to the approach under the
dormant Commerce Clause. However, the aims and effects test is (appar-
ently) dead under the GATT 1994 - at least with respect 'to taxation meas-
ures. 90 Instead, GATT 1994 jurisprudence emphasizes the so-called tradi-
tional approach of determining like products that includes looking at the fol-
lowing factors: "the product's end-uses in a given market; consumers' tastes
and habits .... ; the product's properties, nature and quality."
91
Thus, the similarity between the two doctrines has likely decreased
somewhat as a result of the death of the aims and effects test. However, the
current differences should not be overstated. First, it is possible that the tra-
83 Id. at 1093.
84 Id. at 1284-86.
85 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994), art. 3(2).
86 See Daniel Farber & Robert Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-
Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. RaV. 1401 (1994).
GATT 1994, arts. I1(4) & 111(2).
Farber & Hudec, supra note 84.
89 United States-Taxes on Automobiles, reprinted in 33 LL.M. 1397 (1994) (unadopted by
GATT Council), M13 5.7-5.55; Beer II, supra note 70, at M 5.70-5.77.
90 See Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996)
at 19-22, modifying Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/R (July 11,
1996) at 11 6.14-6.22, available on WTO website <http://www.wto.org> (visited on July 6,
1998).
91 See id. at 19-22.
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ditional like products analysis would uphold the regulatory distinctions up-
held in the two GATT 1947 dispute settlement panel reports that relied on the
"aims and effects" test. For instance, in the so-called GATT Beer II dispute
settlement case discussed above, the panel found that low-alcohol and high-
alcohol beer were not like products and thus could be taxed at different rates
because the "aim and effect" of the measure was not to afford protection.9
The differences in alcoholic content could be significant under traditional
like products analysis as well, particularly since there is little competition
between high and low-alcohol beer which indicates differences in consumer
tastes. Moreover, even if a state measure should violate the national treat-
ment obligation, it may still not violate the GATT if it can be justified under
the general exceptions clause of the GATT.93 The general exceptions clause
allows, for example, measures "necessary to protect human, animal and plant
life or health. 94 Necessary" has been interpreted to require the "least-trade-
restrictive" alternative.95 While GATT jurisprudence has been criticized for
the least-trade restrictive test, U.S. constitutional commentators have de-
scribed tests the Supreme Court applies in similar terms.
96
Since the constraints the states face under the so-called "dormant Com-
merce Clause" do not overlap in every respect with anti-protectionism obli-
gations found within the GATT, the federal government has intruded into a
yellow zone. However, this intrusion is minimal. While it is possible to iden-
tify situations in which a state measure is treated more favorably under the
dormant Commerce Clause than those found within the GATT, it is also pos-
sible to identify instances in which the GATT is more lenient.97 But the more
critical point is that the dormant Commerce Clause does not necessarily rep-
resent the appropriate line that should be drawn with respect to state auton-
92 Beer II, supra note 70, at g] 5.70-5.77.
93 GAIT 1994, art. XX.
94 GATr 1994, art. XX(b).
95 See, e.g., Thailand - Restrictions on the Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, BISD, 37th Supp. at 200 (adopted Nov. 7, 1990).
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 78, at 298.
97 For an example of GATI constraints being more lenient than the dormant Commerce
Clause, compare GATT 1994, art. 111:8 (allowing payments directly to producers even if
payments are derived from taxes on both imported and domestic products) with West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (invalidating subsidy to in-state milk producers
paid directly from tax on all sales of milk, including out-of-state milk, to retailers). Note,
however, that a separate Uruguay Round agreement dealing with subsidies places certain
minimal constraints on state subsidies to industry. For a possible example of dormant
Commerce Clause constraints being more lenient than the GATT, compare Beer II, supra note
70, at 5.19 (holding that Minnesota law giving excise tax break to beer brewed by
microbreweries wherever located violated GATI Article III's national treatment obligation)
with claim by state tax administrators that such a law would withstand dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny. See Schaefer, supra note 75, at 459.
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omy. The federal government implicitly recognized this point by agreeing to
bind the states to the standards in GATT and thus intrude into a yellow zone.
(Admittedly, the degree of intrusion is ultimately determined by the new
jurisprudence in dispute settlement cases under the GATT 1994.) Yet, to
date, the federal government is less willing to recognize in the context of
agreements dealing with trade-in-services and investment that existing con-
stitutional constraints do not maximize the values of federalism.
2. "Grandfathering" of Existing Measures in Trade-in-Services and In-
vestment Agreements: Strategy of Avoidance of a Yellow Zone
In this decade, international trade agreements, including the Uruguay
Round agreements and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
have expanded to address "new" issues, such as trade-in-services and in-
vestment. Obligations regarding these "new" issues potentially increase the
impact of international trade agreements on sub-federal governments because
of the significant regulatory and enforcement authority that sub-federal gov-
ernments exercise in the area of services and investment. However, these
expanded obligations within international trade agreements do not touch
upon grey areas within the split sovereignty of the United States. The anti-
protectionism obligations of trade agreements do not enter into the judicially
imposed outer limits of federal legislative power under the Commerce
Clause.98 The federal government has the constitutional power to restrict
discriminatory state regulations affecting trade-in-services and foreign in-
vestment.
However, the U.S. federal government is confronted with a yellow zone
in the negotiation and implementation of international agreements in the new
areas of trade-in-services and investment.99 The U.S. strategy as regards this
yellow zone has been to pursue the near equivalent of a federal-state clause
with an appropriateness test in services and investment negotiations. Specifi-
cally, the NAFTA exempted all existing state measures that conflicted with
major anti-protectionism obligations of the services and investment chapters
in the agreement.'0 In other words, such measures are "grandfathered."'
0
'
9s See Schaefer, supra note 64.
99 See Schaefer, supra note 75, at 456-58.
10D See North American Free Trade Agreement, reprinted in 32 LL.M. 639 (1993), arts.
1108(1), 1206(1). Originally, sub-federal measures were required to be identified and listed in
an annex in order to be exempted from coverage. However, due to problems in the
identification process, the NAFIA parties agreed to exempt all existing non-conforming
measures without identifying and listing specific measures. See NAFTA Partners to Protect
Sub-Federal Measures from NAFTA Challenges, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Apr. 5, 1996, at 1. See
also Schaefer, supra note 75, at 469-71.
101 Schaefer, supra note 75, at 469-71.
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This grandfathering technique is also utilized by the federal government in
broader multilateral negotiations related to trade-in-services and investment.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) effectively exempts
existing non-conforming state measures from coverage. 102 The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI), currently being negotiated by the twenty-
nine nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD), will also likely exempt from coverage existing state measures
that would conflict with major obligations. 03
By exempting all existing state measures from the major anti-
protectionism obligations in these agreements, the U.S. federal government is
starting the liberalization of state-level services trade and investment restric-
tions at a worse point than it did fifty years ago with respect to trade-in-
goods in the original GATT 194 7.'04 And the original GATT 1947's federal-
state clause was negotiated in an era in which the implications of the federal
government's expanded commerce power were perhaps less clear.
But is the current U.S. strategy to avoid a yellow zone actually justified
as necessary to preserve the values of local autonomy within a federation,
particularly when the U.S. approach to trade-in-goods is much more aggres-
sive? For instance, two of the primary types of "grandfathered" state restric-
tions affecting trade-in-services and investment are citizenship and residency
requirements. While these requirements act as a barrier to trade-in-services
and investment, they do not further the values of federalism. Such restrictions
are essentially beggar-thy-neighbor policies which are responded to in kind
by foreign trading partners. Such requirements do not protect consumers or
health and welfare (or at the very least there are less restrictive means of
achieving such goals). Such requirements also do not represent useful ex-
periments since protectionism is a failed experiment.
As noted above in the context of the GATT dealing with trade-in-goods, a
yellow zone exists for any obligations created by international agreements
that extend beyond existing U.S. constitutional constraints on the states, in-
cluding the dormant Commerce Clause. One possible reason for the U.S.
102 General Agreement on Trade in Services, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1168 (1994), art.
XVII(1) (allowing nations to condition and qualify the extent to which the national treatment
obligations applied to listed service sectors).
10 See Larson Casts Doubt on Ability to Conclude MAI; Sets No Timeline, INsIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 13, 1998, at 11 ("... the U.S. is seeking.., to protect existing state and local
measures that may not conform to the MAI once it is completed").
104 The Protocol of Provisional Application (PPA) by which GAIT was applied exempted
existing federal measures not conforming with GAT obligations (except Articles I and I) if
the Executive did not have authority to change the measure. The PPA did not provide an
exemption for GAT-inconsistent state measures existing as of 1947 since the Executive, via
Congressional delegation, had authority to preempt such measures. See Beer II, supra note 70,
at M 5.44-5.48.
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failure to intrude on the yellow zone with respect to trade-in-services and
investmerit may be that the international trade agreement constraints dealing
with trade-in-services and investment extend beyond existing constitutional
constraints, such as the dormant Commerce Clause, to a greater degree than
with trade-in-goods. Again, however, the dormant Commerce Clause juris-
prudence does not necessarily represent the ideal limits on state autonomy.
Moreover, other clauses of the Constitution, such as the Equal Protection
Clausel' 5 and Privileges and Immunities Clause' °6 have been utilized by the
courts to invalidate citizenship, residency, and other protectionist laws af-
.... 107
fecting trade-in-services and investment. Indeed, some of the measures
"grandfathered" under trade agreements may be constitutional violations.
Naturally, there may be some measures so essential to state autonomy
that they must be immunized from challenge under trade and investment
agreements because the general exceptions clauses of these agreements do
not appropriately recognize pursuit of the objective. Additionally, state laws
may need to be immunized from the introduction of stringent harmonization
obligations in international trade agreements, 108 however, trade agreements
are unlikely to introduce such obligations. With these caveats, however,
binding the states more fully to obligations within current international
agreements governing trade-in-services and investment will advance rather
than harm the values of federalism.
Thus, the avoidance strategy of the federal government can only be justi-
fied as a short-term policy if a strategy of cooperation is pursued to induce
further liberalization. 09 A cooperation strategy, like the avoidance strategy,
reduces federal-state frictions. However, the cooperation strategy will at least
seek the elimination of state autonomy to enact beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
Nonetheless, the bargaining that occurs under a cooperation strategy may fail
to yield significant results if states perceive that avoidance will continue as
the federal government's strategy should cooperation fail. The Government
Procurement Agreement, re-negotiated during the Uruguay Round, provides
15 U.S. CONsT., amend. XIV (applying to persons).
107 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2 (applying to citizens).
107 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating under Equal
Protection Clause measures that denied resident Chinese aliens licenses to operate laundries);
In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (invalidating under Equal Protection Clause a citizenship
requirement to sit for a state bar exam); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869,
881-882 (1985) (invalidating under Equal Protection Clause a protectionist state insurance
measure); Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (invalidating
under Privileges and Immunities Clause a requirement that one be a resident prior to joining
the state bar).
10 See Schaefer, supra note 75, at 476-77.
109 With respect to current and potential cooperation mechanisms, see Schaefer, supra note
75, at 479-83.
27
Schaefer: The Grey Areas and Yellow Zones of Split Sovereignty Exposed by G
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1998
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
such an example. The federal government decided to bind state procurement
to anti-protectionism and other obligations within the GPA on a voluntary
basis. Specifically, the U.S. government's approach to the negotiations
with respect to state governments was to bind a particular state only if a vol-
untary commitment to be bound was submitted by that state's governor, and
only to the extent reflected in that voluntary commitment. 1The federal
government sought to educate the states on the benefits of liberalized pro-
curement policies and the reciprocal liberalization that would be achieved in
foreign procurement markets for U.S. suppliers. Nonetheless, the cooperative
approach only lead to a "standstill" against new state protectionism in thirty-
seven states. No state made a voluntary commitment that liberalized ex-
isting state procurement preferences and thirteen states refused to make any
commitment at all. Therefore, thirteen states maintain complete freedom to
enact further protectionist procurement laws in the future. Accordingly, a
more aggressive strategy of cooperation may need to be instituted to further
the values of federalism.
VII. STATE GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN
POLICIES
U.S. state activity in foreign affairs is growing as a result of globalization.
Yet, the strategies states have chosen in response to globalization differ with
respect to various grey areas exposed by globalization.
In a global economy, attraction of foreign investment can have a signifi-
cant impact on state economic conditions and employment. In such an envi-
ronment, states have incentives to disseminate information on business cli-
mate conditions. Therefore, as mentioned previously, states have established
overseas investment offices that seek to attract foreign investment. Similarly,
in a global economy taking advantage of new markets is important to state
economic conditions and employment. Accordingly, state governors rou-
tinely organize trade missions seeking to enhance contacts between produc-
ers operating within the state and potential foreign buyers. As discussed pre-
viously, such activity, at least as a general matter, likely does not fall within
any grey areas of the division of authority between federal and state govern-
ments despite the power granted to the President to send and receive ambas-
sadors and the prohibition on states entering into compacts with foreign gov-
ernments. The primary goal of such offices and missions is to establish con-
tacts with potential foreign investors and potential purchasers for state ex-
110 Id. at 472-73.
III id.
112 Id. at 488.
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porters. States generally inform and cooperate with federal agencies and em-
bassies when engaging in this type of conduct so as to avoid stretching their
conduct into an area of federal responsibility. Thus, the states' strategy per-
taining to the narrow band of grey surrounding overseas trade and investment
offices and trade missions has largely been one of avoidance and coopera-
tion. State activity in the field of negotiation and conclusion of agreements is
also undertaken in a cooperative manner by generally notifying the federal
government. 113 To date, state activities with respect to negotiations and
agreements generally do not lead to policies that cause negative externalities
for other states or beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
Strikingly, the strategies of cooperation and avoidance chosen by states
with respect to overseas offices, trade missions, agreements, and negotiations
are not being followed within a much more significant grey area exposed by
globalization. This grey area relates to the enactment by states of foreign
policy legislation, particularly legislation seeking to sanction certain foreign
governments. Increased information and communication flows have in-
creased awareness of state government officials and local citizens groups of
conditions in foreign countries. Increased trade and investment flows give
states at least some reason to believe that they maintain a significant lever to
influence policies of foreign governments. As a result, state sanctions legis-
lation with a foreign policy motive, particularly with respect to human rights,
is rapidly increasing. Such legislation was prevalent during the mid-1980s
with respect to South Africa. For instance, many states passed laws that re-
quired state pension funds to divest holdings in South Africa, prevented the
state from procuring goods of South African origin, granted procurement
preferences to those entities that refused to deal with South Africa, and/or
accorded discriminatory tax treatment to South African currency.' A few
such laws were challenged on the basis of the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine and/or as being preempted by federal sanctions legislation.15 The out-
come of such cases varied and none of the cases worked their way up to
the Supreme Court. Accordingly, as noted previously, a grey area remains
regarding state foreign affairs legislation where the federal government has
not explicitly preempted the states. Only a few cases were brought because
"3 Kincaid, supra note 38, at 131, 137.
114 See Bilder, supra note 48, at 822; Howard Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism in
Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. J. INT'L. & Bus.
563,568-71 (1992).
"1 Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (upholding city
ordinances requiring that city pension funds divest their holdings in companies doing business
in South Africa); Springfield Rare Coins Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300 (IIl. 1986)
(striking down discriminatory sales tax on South African currency).
116 See id.
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such litigation can be costly for private plaintiffs, both in terms of legal ex-
penses and possible bad publicity if they are viewed as supporting a rogue
regime in a foreign country. Private plaintiffs generally gave these costs
greater weight than the potential benefits of challenging the state legislation
since the likelihood of success in such a case was uncertain as a result of
questions concerning the scope of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and
the preemptive effect of federal sanction laws.
While a few years of relative calm prevailed in terms of state "foreign
affairs" sanction legislation after apartheid was eliminated in South Africa,
such activity is multiplying. Such legislation is currently focused on Burma
or Myanmar, a country ruled by an undemocratic military regime and main-
taining a poor human rights record. The State of Massachusetts is probably
the largest sub-national economic actor maintaining sanctions with the goal
of changing conditions in Burma. Massachusetts maintains a procurement
law that prevents the state from procuring goods or services from companies
active in Burma unless it would result in inadequate competition. In opera-
tion, the statute results in a company active in Burma having ten percent
added to its bid prior to the determination of the low bidder. Numerous
other states and localities have adopted, or are in the process of considering,
similar laws with respect to Burma. Many states and localities are also con-
sidering sanctions legislation with respect to companies active in Nigeria and
other undemocratic regimes."'
The states are thus following a strategy of significant and increasing in-
trusion into this grey area. This strategy has created some conflict between
the United States and its trading partners, including the European Commu-
nity and Japan. Indeed, trading partners have threatened to bring a WTO dis-
pute settlement case based on the Government Procurement Agreement if the
Massachusetts law is not amended such that it would only apply to contracts
below a threshold established in the agreement." 9 The friction between the
federal government and Massachusetts remains muted, largely because the
federal government has been exceedingly deferential to the Massachusetts
measure despite the existence of federal sanctions legislation against Burma
that only seeks to prevent new investment rather than eliminate current in-
vestment in Burma. 20 The federal government has simply attempted gentle
117 See Lawmaker Offers Change to State Law for U.S., E.U. Promises on Burma, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Apr. 24, 1998, at 1-2.
118 See Jim Lobe, Lawsuit Filed on U.S. State Sanctions Against Burma, INmeRPRESS
SERVICE, May 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5986992; Evelyn Iritani, Coalition Challenges
Myanmar Trade Ban in Court, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 1998, at DI.
19 See EU Threatens WTO Panel Without Quick End to State Sanctions Fight, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Mar. 20, 1998, at 1.
120 See Exec. Order No. 13047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28301 (1997).
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persuasion with Massachusetts in order to have the law amended so as to not
apply to contracts governed by the Government Procurement Agreement.
The federal government has not sought removal of the law in its entirety.
In addition to the influence of globalization, increased activity in this
grey area may result from several political factors. First, state politicians see
such measures as "good politics." 21 In the current political climate, state
politicians gain local political benefits from upstaging the U.S. State De-
partment. Moreover, the costs of such actions are borne largely from those
outside the state and/or dispersed in-state interests (e.g. the taxpayers who
foot a larger bill for state procurement). Second, based in part on their expe-
riences with sanctions against South Africa, state politicians believe that the
federal government will not explicitly preempt such measures as a result of
"state sovereignty" political concerns and that private parties will continue to
be hesitant to challenge such measures.
The states' calculation with respect to the federal government appears
correct. The federal government views explicit preemption of state foreign
affairs legislation to fall within a yellow zone. However, the appropriate
question is whether this yellow zone protects some benefits of state auton-
omy in a federal system? State foreign policies lead to significant potential
externalities and the creation of negative externalities is a strong justification
for federal intervention. Any overt retaliation by aggrieved foreign nations or
even subtler forms of damage to U.S. foreign policy is likely to fall upon the
nation as a whole. Even if a foreign government decides to retaliate and at-
tempts to target retaliation at entities located within the particular state
adopting a sanctions law, spill-over effects to other states are likely. With the
federal political branches refusing to enter a yellow zone, despite the fact the
yellow zone does not reflect a concern over the values of state autonomy
sought through federalism, it is left to businesses to challenge such legisla-
tion and ultimately courts to resolve the grey area that remains in the absence
of explicit federal preemption.
Indeed, the state strategy of intrusion undoubtedly would continue to be
successful, not in achieving the changes in foreign government policy they
seek, but in aggrandizing the power of the states and providing political
benefits for state politicians, were it not for the ability of private business
interests to finally overcome collective action problems of their own. The
121 See, e.g., The Mass That Roared, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1997, at 32-33 (".. . in the
middle of his campaign last year to nab the [U.S.] Senate seat of John Kerry, [Governor] Weld
noticed that Mr. Kerry had been slow to endorse sanctions on Myanmar [i.e. Burma]. Mr.
Weld got religion. Last June 25th, flanked by Burmese activists, Mr. Weld signed the bill").
See also Fenton, supra note 114, at 590.
12 See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 114, at 591-92.
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National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), a coalition of businesses of which
thirty are on the Massachusetts Burma law's restricted list, has filed suit in
federal court seeking to have the Massachusetts's Burma law ruled unconsti-
tutional.1 3 The NFTC's claim is that Massachusetts's Burma law is impliedly
preempted by existing federal sanctions against Burma and that, even if fed-
eral sanctions legislation does not preempt the state action, the dormant for-
. 124
eign affairs doctrine prohibits the state law. By acting in a coalition, the
businesses are able to overcome a "free rider"-type situation in which busi-
nesses wait for each other to challenge the law. First, by acting in a coalition,
businesses are able to share the costs of litigation. Second, any bad publicity
will be spread among many entities and utilizing an organization name will
further reduce any potential consumer backlash. While the likelihood of suc-
cess is not certain, the judgment was made that the costs of the legislation to
businesses, particularly in light of the proliferation of similar laws, was great
enough to proceed. Even if the suit fails, the businesses can argue forcefully
that the Congress must always consider the issue of explicit preemption of
state sanctions when it passes federal sanctions legislation. In the current
state of grey, the Congress can respond to businesses that Congress need not
explicitly address the issue in legislation since the Constitution already pro-
hibits such action and then leave it too businesses to seek enforcement of the
grey constitutional constraints.
Thus, it is possible the grey area of state-level foreign affairs activity will
be clarified in the next few years. However, it is by no means certain since
the court might strike down the Massachusetts law on rather narrow grounds
or, alternatively, dismiss the case due to standing problems.125 Therefore,
conscientious politicians willing to weigh the values of federalism are re-
quired to promote the values of federalism by changing state strategies of
intrusion to strategies of cooperation and avoidance. There are some early
indications that the federal government is gradually shifting to a more proac-
123 See NFTC Launches Constitutional Challenge Against State Sanctions, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, May 1, 1998, at 1, 23.
124 See id. See also USA-Engage Announces Constitutional Challenge of State Law, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Feb. 13, 1998, at 3-4. Note that an additional claim raised by plaintiffs is that the
Massachusetts law violates the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.
175 For instance, the court may invalidate the law on the basis of the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause by ruling that the state law does not meet the market participant exception.
See, e.g., South-Central Timber Development v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97 (1984) (In order
to meet the market participant exception, a "State may not impose conditions, whether by
statute, regulation or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that
particular market"). As a result, the court may not eliminate the grey area surrounding the
dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine.
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tive strate,' of "aggressive cooperation" to ward off future state measures of
this type.
VIII. COMPARISON TO CANADIAN STRATEGIES
The strategies pursued in response to globalization by the U.S. federal
government and state governments can be compared with those of their Ca-
nadian counterparts. The comparison further highlights the misguided "new
federalism" apparent in the strategies pursued by the various levels of gov-
ernment in the United States.
A. Grey Areas in Canadian Federalism
1. External Affairs
At the time Canada federated, it was a dominion of the United Kingdom
such that its external affairs were handled by the United Kingdom. 127 As a
result, the Canadian Constitution has only one provision regarding treaties
and that provision has been read out of existence by judicial interpretation.12
Accordingly, it is perhaps not a surprise to find that questions regarding the
legal division of authority between the federal and provincial authorities with
respect to treaty-making linger (although currently latent) and that the divi-
sion of authority regarding treaty implementation is colored by significant
grey.
The federal government maintains it has an exclusive treaty-making
power. 129 While some provinces have been willing to recognize exclusive
federal treaty-making capacity, at least one province, Quebec, still maintains
that it has the power to enter into treaties (agreements governed by interna-
126 Indeed, the officials of the United States Trade Representative's office recently met
with the NGA to urge states to consult with the USTR before considering sanctions
legislation. See USA-Engage Announces Constitutional Challenge of State Law, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 13, 1998, at 3-4. However, it appears such consultations will focus on having
state sanctions proposals conform with the Government Procurement Agreement, rather than
tie wisdom of such sanctions legislation in terms of the values of federalism. Nevertheless, the
federal government apparently had a role in warding off sanctions being considered by the
Maryland legislature against Nigeria.
See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA, §§1.1, 11.2 (Carswell 3rd ed.,
looseleaf, 1992).
1 That provision being British North American Act, subsequently renamed the
Constitution Act of 1867, § 132.
129 See, e.g., Debra Steger, Canadian Implementation of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, in IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 243, 261 (John Jackson &
Alan Sykes eds. (1997)) ("Treaty-making is also an exclusively federal power ... . The
federal government has never accepted the existence of [a provincial treaty-making] power").
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tional law). 130 However, attempts by Quebec in the 1960s to enter into
agreements with France and other foreign nations that might be governed by
international law and dealing with cultural, educational, and technical coop-
eration created significant controversy.' 3' The federal government has been
vigilant in ensuring that its assent was given to the most important of these
arrangements prior to their conclusion. 132 The assent has come in the form of
an exchange of notes between federal governments, the establishment of a
general framework agreement with the other government providing that
provinces could enter into such arrangements, or the passage of an Act of
Parliament.
2. Internal Affairs
The Canadian Constitution, in contrast to the U.S. Constitution, grants
legislative powers to the provinces and leaves the residual powers to the fed-
eral government, explicitly stating some of the powers that this residual en-
compasses. The federal government is granted the power to make laws for
"peace, order and good government," including laws relating to "trade and
commerce." 3 4 However, the trade and commerce power, which reads quite
similar to its U.S. counterpart, has been narrowly interpreted by the courts so. .. . . . 135 
..
as to protect provincial jurisdiction. The most significant provincial Tpower
arises from the grant of the power over "property and civil rights."' This
head of power gives provinces significant regulatory authority over the pro-
fessions, insurance, securities, and other service-related industries.' 37 It also
gives power to the provinces with respect to expropriation and other invest-
ment-related issues. Whether a particular piece of legislation fits within a
federal or provincial head of power can be controversial. Canadian courts
130 See, e.g., J.V. Morin, International Law, Treaty Making Power, Constitutional Law,
Position of the Government of Quebec, 45 CAN. BAR. REv. 160 (1967).
131 See, e.g., Edward McWhinney, Canadian Federalism, and the Foreign Affairs and
Treaty Power: The Impact of Quebec's Quiet Revolution, 1969 CAN. Y.B. INTL L. 4-5.
132 See, e.g., Gerald Fitzgerald, Educational and Cultural Agreements and Ententes of
France, Canada and Quebec: Birth of a New Treaty Making Technique for Federal States, 60
AM. J. INT'L L. 529 (1966).
133 British North American Act, subsequently renamed the Constitution Act 1867, §§ 91-
92.
134 Id., art. 91.
135 See John D. Whyte, Federal Powers Over the Economy: Finding New Jurisdictional
Room, 13 CAN. Bus. L.J. 257, 259 (1988) (noting that "federalism has been the political idea
that has attracted the highest level of judicial respect").
136 See HOGG, supra note 127, at 537.
137 Id. at §§ 21.5,21.7,21.10.
138 Id. at§§21.11,28.5.
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undertake a two-step process: first, they characterize the law as dealing with
a particular matter, and second, they determine whether that matter falls
within a provincial or federal head of power after interpreting the scope of
various heads of power.139 As a result of the Canadian constitutional structure
and interpretations, the grey areas are more prominent in the Canadian fed-
eration as compared with the United States in regards to legislative powers of
the federal and sub-federal governments.
In Canada, the power of the federal government to implement interna-
tional trade agreement obligations applicable to the provinces is not assured.
Under the famous Labor Conventions case,14° the Privy Council ruled that
the federal government did not have a broad treaty implementing power,
rather legislation implementing a treaty would have to be justified under a
specific head of power granted to the federal government in the Constitution.
If the subject matter of an obligation within an international agreement fell
within a provincial head of power under the Constitution rather than a federal
head of power, then the provinces alone would have the authority to imple-
ment the obligation. 14 However, the Supreme Court of Canada has at times
hinted at dissatisfaction with the Labor Conventions rule.142 Moreover, the
Court has potentially expanded the trade and commerce power and "peace,
order and good government" clause enough to support trade agreement im-
plementing legislation. 43 Indeed, many Canadian commentators speculated
that the federal government would have been victorious in a jurisdictional
case that probably would have arisen had the Canadian government taken an
aggressive posture with respect to legislation implementing the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement in the late 1980s. However, by the time the Canada
faced implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the
Uruguay Round Agreements in the early and mid-1990s, commentators felt"
less certain that the court would be as solicitous given the climate of the Ca-
nadian federation.
139 Id. at §§ 15.4-15.5; Steger, supra note 129, at 266.
140 A.G. Canada v. A.G. Ontario [1937] AC 326.
141 Id. at 351. See also Steger, supra note 129, at 267.
142 See HoGG, supra note 127, § 11.5(c).
143 Regarding the possibilities of federal government using the "trade and commerce"
power or the "peace, order and good government" clause to implement trade agreement
obligations in the grey areas, see Debra Steger, supra note 129, at 270-76.
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B. Current Canadian Strategies
1. Federal Government Strategy With Respect to International Trade
and Investment Agreements
Any attempt to bind provinces fully to the trade-in-services and invest-
ment obligations within international agreements might expose grey areas in
Canada's split sovereignty to a significant degree. Again, the provincial head
of power related to "property and civil rights" gives provinces significant
regulatory authority over numerous services sectors, including professional
services, insurance, and securities. However, the technique of "grandfather-
ing" of existing non-conforming measures within NAFTA and the exemption
of listed non-conforming measures in the GATS has minimized any intru-
sion, or at least immediate intrusion, into these grey areas.144
Nonetheless, with respect to certain obligations, the provinces are fully
bound and current provincial law may conflict with obligations within inter-
national trade agreements. For instance, the Canadian federal government
made no reservation for provincial measures inconsistent with NAFTA's
provisions regarding expropriation of foreign investments. NAFTA's stan-
dards for what constitutes expropriation may be broader than those under
current provincial law and its standards for compensation may differ from
those provided under provincial law. The provincial head of power related to
"property and civil rights" encompasses expropriation matters and thus a
jurisdictional case could arise in this area. The Canadian government pursued
minimal intrusion to reduce the likelihood of a jurisdictional case being
brought to the courts, but it believed that it maintained at least a fair chance
of success in any such a challenge in light of new jurisprudence under the
"trade and commerce" power and the "peace, order and good government"
clause. However, it is likely that any further intrusions will have to be pre-
ceded by a cooperative strategy since the federal government is not necessar-
ily anxious to press for a court case.
The U.S. strategy of avoidance of a yellow zone contrasts with the Cana-
dian strategy of minimal intrusion into a grey area. The U.S. federal govern-
ment strategy can only be justified if liberalization of provincial and state
restrictions on services and investment will need to occur reciprocally. In
other words, since the yellow zone faced by the U.S. federal government
does not relate to any values sought to be promoted by federalism, the only
legitimate reason for the U.S. federal government to pursue a strategy of
144 The minimalist approach in the respective implementing bills of NAFTA and the
Uruguay Round Agreements also minimizes any immediate intrusion. See Anonymous, Issues
of Constitutional Jurisdiction, in Canada: The State of the Federation 39, 45-46 (1987-88
ed.); Schaefer, supra note 73, at 642-43.
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avoidance to date is the existence of analogous Canadian provincial restric-
tions. However, the Canadian government is unlikely to launch a campaign
of "aggressive cooperation" until the U.S. government takes the lead in
adopting such a strategy to eliminate remaining beggar-thy-neighbor policies
at the state level.
2. Canadian Provincial Strategies with Respect to Foreign Affairs Leg-
islation
The Canadian provinces have not enacted foreign affairs sanctions legis-
lation such as the Massachusetts Burma law. The lack of such legislation
may result from the lack of grey with respect to such authority, i.e., the legal
authority of a province to enact such a measure may well be denied by the
Canadian constitution. Such a law is not likely to be characterized as relating
to a matter within a provincial head of power.'45 Alternatively, the provinces
are simply showing greater restraint in the area of unilateral sanctions and
instituting a policy of avoidance recognizing that provincial action, let alone
federal action, is likely to be ineffective and create possible negative exter-
nalities. In either case, it is striking that the Canadian system operates in a
manner in which such activity is not undertaken at the sub-federal level when
most observers view the Canadian federation as maintaining more significant
grey in the realm of foreign affairs as compared to the United States.
IX. CONCLUSION
Globalization is not a threat to U.S. federalism. Rather, the choice of
strategies by governments in the United States in response to globalization
threatens the values that federalism seeks to promote. Indeed, the choice of
strategies by governments in the United States reveals that the renewed calls
for a "new federalism" may have gone awry. The federal government strat-
egy with respect to globalization allows for state autonomy, and states are
utilizing such autonomy, to adopt beggar-thy-neighbor policies, policies that
create potentially significant negative externalities, and other inefficient poli-
cies resulting from prisoner's dilemma-type situations. Moreover, the benefits
of state autonomy, such as acting as laboratories for experimentation and
providing potentially greater public participation in democracy, are not pro-
moted through the strategies adopted by governments in the United States in
response to globalization.
Examining the strategies chosen by governments in Canada in response
to grey areas and yellow zones exposed by globalization lends further sup-
145 Discussion with anonymous Canadian law professor at American Society of
International Law's 1998 Annual Meeting. Any error in the text is my responsibility.
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port to the conclusion that "new federalism" with the United States is in dan-
ger of proceeding down a mistaken path. Canada's federal government is
following a policy of minimal intrusion into grey areas with respect to trade
negotiations and Canada's provinces are pursuing a strategy of avoidance
with respect to sanctions legislation for foreign policy purposes. These
strategies instituted by governments in what many consider a less centralized
and less stable federation in which the division of powers is subject to more
significant grey areas are arguably in stark contrast to those being pursued by
governments in the United States.
Business may seek to rescue (for their own benefit) the governments of
the United States from their misguided implementation of a "new federal-
ism" reflected in the strategies they choose in response to globalization.
Businesses may do so by lobbying the federal government to seek further
state liberalization of trade and investment policies and by challenging state
foreign affairs sanctions legislation in the courts. However, policing by busi-
nesses in these areas is unlikely to be a complete success. Moreover, while
businesses can serve a limited policing role for "new federalism" in the area
of trade negotiations and foreign policy, businesses may have motives ad-
verse to an appropriate "new federalism" in other areas of governmental
regulation. A process engaged in by businesses alone cannot ensure the
proper roles for federal and state government in "new federalism." Nor can
courts ensure the proper division of exercised authority between federal and
state governments. Courts face doctrinal constraints and are limited to re-
viewing the federal balance only in the context of "cases and controversies"
brought before them.
Accordingly, implementation of a "new federalism" that respects the val-
ues of federalism will require conscientious politicians willing to implement
a "required considerations" model of federalism. Specifically, federal and
state government officials must go beyond the politics and rhetoric of "new
federalism" and undertake a fundamental reassessment of how all areas of
regulation should be divided between governments applying criteria that fo-
cuses on the values that federalism seeks to promote. Indeed, a change in the
strategies of governments to the grey areas and yellow zones exposed by
globalization might only occur in the context of a overall reassessment. Con-
scientious politicians at the two levels of government may disagree after
weighing the values of federalism. However, the lure of self-interested
weighing is reduced if numerous areas of regulation are reassessed simulta-
neously or at least in succession. The overall reassessment will lead to a re-
duction in state autonomy with respect to the strategies pursued in response
to globalization but also, in all likelihood, to an enhancement of state auton-
omy in other areas.
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